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Disagreement In Attitude Examples

Moral problems can be interpersonal or personal. Problems are interpersonal when there are disagreements between or between two or more people and personally when a person is uncertain. But what is the nature of this disagreement or uncertainty? This is the question to which Stevenson organizes all his work in ethical theory and with which he begins both ethics and language (1944) and Facts and Values (1963a). Objection from Rational Irresolvability. According to this objection, if a strong emotivism is true, then there can be no objective moral truth, rational criticism of one`s moral judgments, and rational moral disagreement. Because after a strong emotivism, moral judgment is that something is bad (good, etc.), partly only a negative attitude towards this thing, and attitudes, feelings or interests are not rationally governable. This objection has a strong and weak version. The strong version argues that attitudes cannot be governed rationally and therefore never are. This objection lacks its imprint against Stevenson, because as we have seen in sections 2.2 and 4.2, Stevenson does much to show how attitudes can be rationally governable and are in fact frequent (see in particular 1950, 63-70; 1961-62b). In other words, attitudes can and often are framed, shaped or coordinated by the presentation of motives that are logically or psychologically linked to intermediate beliefs. The weak version argues that, in principle, postures can sometimes be rationally ungovernable. Stevenson himself admits that this could be the case (z.B 1944, 336). However, by this admission, some are tempted to argue for the next radically different objection.

Two of these models, called “P1” and “P4,” receive a lot of attention from Stevenson because they are paradigmatic for the phrase “This is good,” what Stevenson calls his “First Model” and “Second Model” of analysis. These models and therefore (P1) and (P4) are distinguished above all by descriptive richness and emotional strength. (P1)s descriptive content is rare, provides only information about the spokesperson`s attitude and therefore provides only a little more information than is transmitted by the relatively strong emotional element (P1); Therefore (P1) well models the use of an ethical phrase in which the forehead and center is the attitude of a spokesperson. (P4) descriptive content provides more complex, more accurate information on the qualities the speaker approves of and merely characterizes “It`s good” as an emotional force for mediation; Therefore (P4) well models the use of an ethical phrase in which the front and center are the moral norms of a spokesman. Stevensones (P4) has a descriptive element that is more accurate than (P3a) –(P3b). It also removes a pattern of the emotional element, so that instead there is only one characterization that an emotional element is present. Unlike (P0a) — (P1) that emphasize the disposition relationships between ethical concepts and attitudes – that is, emotional significance – and instead of centering the disposition relationships between ethical concepts and beliefs – that is, descriptive meaning. (P4) thus covers the passive provisions of ethical concepts that must be used as a result of the more specific cognitive states of a speaker or writer on the characteristics or characteristics of an act, a person, etc., and active tendencies of terms to provoke such cognitive states in an audience. Perhaps the more descriptive “thick” ethical terms such as “cruel,” “friendly” or “courageous” are the best examples of notions that have such predispositions, even if they are obvious, even if one thinks of “thin” ethical terms such as “good” or “just”.

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